Mass Nouns, Count Nouns and Non-Count Laycock – – In Alex Barber (ed.), Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Elsevier. A crucial part of Taurek’s argument is his contention that i. John M. Taurek, ” Should the Numbers Count?” Philosophy & Public Affairs 6, no. 4. (Summer I ). Oxford University Press USA publishes scholarly works in all academic disciplines, bibles, music, children’s books, business books, dictionaries, reference.
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However, unlike a consequentialist of the simpler sort at least where the only relevant consideration may be the number of lives at stake, a nonconsequentialist may argue that numbers are not the only relevant consideration; one also needs to consider whether, for example, it is just to prosecute an innocent individual.
Hence, numbers play a role in the Standard Picture only as one input among many in the deliberative process of a moral agent. Because in the former option Yoda can prevent a harm that is more serious by a significant degree in comparison to a harm that Yoda can prevent in the latter option.
This suggests that the Kamm-Scanlon Argument still involves covertly combining the claims jon B and C. This response of course raises the question of how advocates of the Standard Picture would prioritize numbers versus these other values.
Rethinking how non-consequentialists should count lives
Willenken argues that we ought to accept commonsense morality rather than endorse the following Strongest reason thesis: Post titles cannot be questions and must describe the philosophical content of the posted material. In such a case, a nonconsequentialist may conclude that intentionally harming an innocent individual is something one should not conut, even if this means letting five people die. Want to add to the discussion? Besides the prima facie implausibility cojnt numbers skepticism, Michael Otsuka has developed an intriguing argument against this position.
Kavka – – Philosophical Studies 36 3: The sort of chance procedure in mind is something like the following: However, the notion of badness or goodness simpliciter to which Numbrrs appeals seems to be the very notion that Taurek rejects. Given that the relevant feature of Star Trek is that the harm that Kirk can prevent for Spock is greater than the harm that Kirk can prevent for Uhura by a significant degree, we need a principle that takes this into account.
Zach Barnett – – Analysis 78 1: Anarchy, State and Utopia. Comments which are clearly not in direct response to the posted content may be removed. If there were no other relevant considerations, then numbers would determine what one ought to do. If S does nothing, then no one will be spared from harm. For example, it might be said that there is just no metric to weigh numbers against considerations of justice.
The Ethical Principles of Effective Altruism. They would still be equal claims that are aggregated. Aggregation and the separateness of persons. I am also very grateful to Hille Paakkunainen and the anonymous referees at Res Publica for providing many thorough and challenging comments over multiple drafts of this paper. The harm that S can prevent for both x and y is serious. But this seems counterintuitive.
The well-being of x and y are equal in comparison prior to any intervention by S.
I think it does. There are certainly other kinds of chance procedures a Numbers Partly Count proponent might wish to adopt for what Yoda ought to do in the Star Wars scenario, such as to choose whom to aid on the basis of a slightly different procedure where in round 2 given that A was chosen in round 1 Number has a smaller chance of being aided given that Secura will receive more of the numbrrs if chosen in comparison to B and C.
Remember me on this computer.
So, given PN we can abstract away from the numbers and just compare A alone to Secura. She may simply choose to save someone. Argue your Position Opinions are not valuable here, arguments are! In particular, one should consider loss of persons. Links to Google Translated versions of posts are not allowed. In particular, I argued that on the Standard Picture, what distinguishes nonconsequentialists from consequentialists is not that numbers and aggregation do not matter, but that they matter only as one input among many in a deliberative, practical reasoning process about what a moral agent ought to do.
Don’t Count on Taurek: Vindicating the Case for the Numbers Counting | Yishai Cohen –
So, given PN we can abstract away from the numbers and just compare A alone to Susan. Why not, similarly, hold that some persons have to bear some costs that benefit other persons more, for the sake of the overall social good?
I shall explain how a nonconsequentialist can still respect the separateness of persons while allowing for aggregation. The Standard Picture solves the Number Problem because it holds a plausible account of the separateness of persons.
For example, it has been said that aggregation could lead to a large number of small harms adding up to outweigh a smaller number of large harms, or to the repugnant conclusion. Oxford University Press, ; Nagel, T.
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9: Become a Redditor and subscribe to one of thousands of communities. The harm that S can prevent for y is less serious to a nontrivial degree in comparison to the harm that S can prevent for x. Those balanced out on his side are, I would say, the beneficiaries of his successful complaint.
Death and Whom to Save from It. Numbers skepticism mohn been numbdrs motivated by the anti-consequentialist thought that the goods, harms and well-being of individual people do not aggregate in any morally significant way. Otsuka by contrast focuses on the mere mitigation of a harm.
Instead, the conclusion is that saving the greater number is better. Suppose A is in danger of breaking his finger and B is in danger of losing her life.
On the other hand, it is still joun that all individuals have a chance of being saved, which accommodates the second alleged fact. Science Logic and Mathematics. If so, we obtain the outcome that it is worse if B and C die than if only A dies. For consequentialists, the answer seems simple: See also Hirose, I.